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Officially, the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing weredeemed a great success by Chinese authorities.There is no denying that the Olympics boosted the
regime’s prestige in the eyes of the public at home and, to a
large measure, abroad as well. However, the events in Tibet
a few months earlier tarnished this success, triggering nega-
tive reactions among a section of international opinion sym-
pathetic to the ideas of freedom and human rights. Far from
the picture of consensus conveyed by the Games‘ official slo-
gan (“One World, One Dream”) and the impression of a
harmonious and peaceful power that the Chinese authorities
sought to project in their new relations internationally, their
actions and words during the Tibet crisis signalled to the
world that China was still ruled by a Communist party, with
the rigidity, intransigence, and aggressiveness this entailed in
its political stance.
The biggest failure of the made-for-export Chinese propa-
ganda was the attempt to pass off the Tibetan revolt as sim-
ply a conspiracy hatched abroad by the Dalai Lama and his
supporters among Western “anti-China” forces, with not a
shred of evidence of such a plot. Of course, it was well
known that Tibetan exiles considered the approach of the
Beijing Olympics as a dream opportunity to make their
voices heard, but discontented Tibetans at home might have
had the same idea. It is difficult to imagine that the govern-
ment in exile would have been able to organise at least 150
protest movements, (2) occurring not only throughout the
Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) but also in every area
with a significant Tibetan presence in the four neighbouring
provinces. Even if that were possible, why had so many Ti-
betans responded to this supposed call and taken the risk –
an especially serious one in Tibet – of staging protests, were
it not for deep discontent and even despair? In major Chi-
nese cities, why did Tibetan students at institutions for mi-
norities risk endangering their cushy conditions in order to
protest? And what is one to make of the explosion of vio-
lence on 14 March 2008, when a small minority of Lhasa’s
population targeted Hans and Huis living there?
Before examining how the Chinese authorities dealt with
the crisis, it is necessary to look at the deep discontent
among a section of the Tibetan people that was expressed
in March 2008. These two issues are related, because
China’s current leadership is responsible for the Tibet policy
of the past few years and must deal with its consequences.T he  CCP ’s  T ib et  p oli cy
I give below a very brief account of relations between Tibet
and the People’s Republic of China, as other articles in this
issue cover the same ground in detail. The official position
has always been that Tibet belonged to China and that the
Chinese troops’ entry in 1950 amounted to “liberation.” But
Mao had been at pains in 1951 to sign a 17-point agreement
recognising in principle some measure of autonomy for what
was deemed the Tibet administration, that is to say the fu-
ture TAR. Of course, in practice, it would have been diffi-
cult to respect this autonomy at a time when the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) was imposing a totalitarian regime
throughout the country in the name of “socialist transforma-
tion.” This lay behind the 1959 uprising, the failure of which
led to the Dalai Lama’s flight into exile in India, followed by
harsh repression and direct administrative control by Han
Chinese sent by Beijing. This direct takeover of the govern-
ment by the Hans had never happened before in the history
of Tibet-China relations. In 1965, Tibet received autonomy
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1. I am grateful to Françoise Robin for comments on the article’s first version. Its title in the
original French, “Au loin l’harmonie: la gestion de la crise tibétaine de 2008 par les
autorités chinoises,” was inspired by that of the Dalai Lama’s memoirs in French, Au loin
la liberté, Fayard, 1990.











The Tibet crisis tainted the success of the 2008 Beijing Olympics. The handling of the crisis showed the CCP’s rigid
denial of genuine dialogue and compromise and adherence to a formula of repression and economic growth. Current
leaders are  enmeshed in this policy, but a new generation might well seek out policies more in tune with the quest
for ”harmony” at home and ”peaceful rise” on the world scene.
status, as did other regions containing what were officially
characterised as “minority nationalities.” Then followed the
terror of the Cultural Revolution. But after the launch of the
reform and opening policy in 1979, and in the early 1980s,
CCP leader Hu Yaobang tried to correct the dreadful legacy
of the Mao era in Tibet as elsewhere. Hu expressed the
Party’s regrets over the excesses of the Cultural Revolution
era. He introduced localisation of public jobs and initiated
the first meetings with the Dalai Lama’s representatives in
order to seek reconciliation. But after his ouster in early
1987, the situation became tense again, the “Hanisation” of
public jobs resumed, and the first wave of protests broke out
in October 1987, but in a big way in March 1989, marking
the 30th anniversary of the Dalai Lama’s flight. The CCP
secretary for Tibet then was Hu Jintao, now China’s presi-
dent. He came down severely on protests: the army used live
bullets on protesters, causing several deaths, and many ar-
rests and sentencings followed. However, the troubles were
limited to Lhasa and surrounding areas.
These events were soon followed by the Tiananmen protests
and the bloody crackdown of 4 June 1989, and in early
1992 by Deng Xiaoping’s famous Southern Tour, which re-
launched China on the reform and growth path, while leav-
ing the political status quo untouched. Since then, the
CCP’s dual track (strict political control and pursuit of eco-
nomic growth) showed itself in its policy towards minorities,
especially the restive Uyghurs of Xinjiang and the Tibetans.
Another development from that period cannot be ignored in
this context: the de facto if not de jure replacement of Com-
munism by nationalism as the regime’s ideological bulwark
and propaganda theme, especially aimed at the youth. The
hardening showed up right from 1992 with the posting of the
intransigent Chen Kuiyuan as the CCP secretary for
Tibet, (3) and became harder still with Hu Jintao’s ascent to
power in 2002, especially after he emerged from his prede-
cessor Jiang Zemin’s shadow after 2005. This policy has
three main facets: tight control, severe repression, and a
focus on economic development demonstrated through mas-
sive investment.
Tight control has mostly taken the form of massive interven-
tion in religious matters. For instance, the authorities issued
an order setting out regulations governing the “reincarnation
of Tibetan living Buddhas,” which took effect on 1 Septem-
ber 2007. (4) It stipulates that all decisions on this issue by re-
ligious entities have to be approved by China’s State Admin-
istration for Religious Affairs. In a way it formalised and
made more explicit an older practice, as in 1995 the
Panchen Lama chosen by the Tibetans was kidnapped (and
has not been seen since) and replaced by a young boy cho-
sen by the Chinese authorities. (5) According to experts, this
issue created resentment among Tibetan laity and monks, in-
cluding those well disposed towards Chinese authorities.
However, among the Han Chinese, including intellectuals
and historians, I found that almost no one had heard of this
interference by the political authorities. This shows the ef-
fectiveness of media control in China today.
Tight control also showed up in the form of a patriotic edu-
cation campaign launched in 1996 and extended in1998 to
all Tibetan-populated areas outside Tibet, and which was
reinvigorated by the new Party secretary in 2006. This pa-
triotic education, reminiscent of Mao era indoctrination
drives, consists essentially of getting Buddhist monks and
nuns to publicly denounce the Dalai Lama during lengthy
meetings or in writing. Tibetan officials were also subject to
this treatment. One Tibetan monk told the cadres who had
arrived to impart patriotic education, “Why don’t you try
and make the Hui people eat pork? If you succeed, then
we’ll denounce the Dalai Lama.” (6) Chinese Communists
had tried to force Muslims to eat pork during the Cultural
Revolution (a friend of mine witnessed this when he was a
“sent-down youth” in Xinjiang), but that is no longer the
case now. The CCP’s wish to replace an image they de-
spised with one they revered was manifested when they tried
to erect a Mao statue beside the Lhasa airport in 2006. Pa-
triotism, in fact, was not just vague love for the country. An
article by the China Centre for Tibetan Studies on the offi-
cial policy towards Tibetans sets this out clearly: “To love
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3. Of the same generation as Hu Jintao, whom he succeeded as the Party Secretary for
Tibet in 1992, Chen had built his career in another minority region, Inner Mongolia. See
Robert Barnett, “The Chinese Frontiersman and the Winter Worms – Chen Kuiyuan in the
T.A.R., 1992-2000,” available at: http://www.columbia.edu/itc/ealac/barnett/pdfs/
link29-chenpiece.pdf.
4. The term “living Buddha” (huo fo) does not appear to hold much significance for Tibetan
Buddhists, who only speak of “reincarnations,” but it is one the Chinese use.
5. See Tsering Shakya, The Dragon in the Land of Snows, Columbia University Press, 1999.











A pro-Tibet activist is arrested by policemen as he
protest prior to the beginning of the Beijing Olympics
torch relay, on 7 April 2008 in Paris amid high security
and threats of “spectacular” protests.
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the motherland is to love the socialist motherland led by the
Chinese Communist Party.” (7)
The effort to capture hearts and minds has often taken
provocative forms, especially in the statements of the current
Party Secretary for Tibet, Zhang Qingli, who has doubled
as political commissar of the People’s Armed Police in the
region since he took office in May 2006. He said during the
patriotic education campaign, “The Party Central Commit-
tee is the real living Buddha of the people.” According to
Tibet Daily, he said the day after the 14 March 2008 riots
that the Dalai Lama “is a wolf in monk’s robe, a devil with
a human face but the heart of a beast; we are now engaged
in a fierce blood and fire battle with the Dalai clique, a life
and death battle between us and the enemy.” In an unrecon-
structed Maoist style, he called for “a people’s war against
separatism.” (8)
What is worrying about this is that Zhang is neither eccen-
tric nor off-centred, but has a direct link to Hu Jintao, under
whom he worked in the Communist Youth League central
committee from 1983 to 1986. He thus belongs to the
League faction (Tuanpai), Hu’s main power base in the
CCP. More specifically, he is among those who, like Hu
himself in the 1970s and 1980s, became specialists in
China’s western regions, which are economically backward,
politically conservative, and home to minorities who have to
be taken in hand. Zhang joined the Party in 1973 and began
to steadily rise under Mao, effortlessly adjusted to the late
1970s reforms, and rose to the provincial leadership level in
his native Shandong. In 1998 he joined the “western China
clique,” and was made propaganda chief for Gansu Province
and political commissar of the civil-military reserve division
before being sent the next year to Xinjiang, where he rose
to vice-secretary of the regional CCP and commander and
vice-secretary of the Xinjiang Production and Construction
Corps, as well as general manager of its corporate arm, the
China Xinjiang Group. The paramilitary Production and
Construction Corps, mostly staffed by Hans, is the region’s
economic heart, the major instrument of control, and a mili-
tary strike force in case of conflict with minority nationalities
or with Central Asian neighbours. Moreover, Zhang’s pro-
file closely resembles that of leaders recently picked by Hu
Jintao for three other western provinces: Gansu, Sichuan,
and Yunnan. The heads of the Nationalities Affairs Com-
mission and the State Administration for Religious Affairs
are also members of the Hu-led Youth League clique, which
favours strict control. (9)
Given this situation, the level of repression over the last few
years is hardly surprising. The number of arrests rose sharply
in 2007. (10) This was partly linked to the celebration the
monks organised over the U.S. Congressional Gold Medal
awarded to the Dalai Lama, much to the authorities’ cha-
grin.
From a more positive point of view and in the Deng Xiaop-
ing logic, Tibet has also been subject to a policy of invest-
ment. From 1965 to 2005, the region received 96.87 billion
yuan of central funds. From 1993 onwards, 90 percent of
revenues have come from Beijing. Moreover, China’s richest
cities and provinces have been obliged to hand over aid quo-
tas for Tibet. Thus, in 2007 Tibet’s GDP stood at 34.2 bil-
lion yuan, or 12,000 yuan per capita, which is a decent fig-
ure. The Beijing leadership certainly aims to douse ethnic
and political conflicts through development, but this strategy
raises more problems than it solves, due to a number of rea-
sons that I will not go into here. (11) Essentially, the benefits
from these investments have generally not accrued to the Ti-
betans themselves, and have led to a stepped-up Sinicisation
or “Hanisation.” The clearest example of this is the Qing-
hai-Tibet railway, which opened in July 2006 to ferry
tourists, of course, but also many Han and Hui immigrants,
who have been assuming a dominant role in the economy of
major cities to the detriment of young Tibetans. (Inciden-
tally, the train also facilitates rapid deployment of troops to
stamp out any rebellion.) Moreover, development often ig-
nores environmental concerns as well as traditional Tibetan
beliefs and lifestyles. For instance, the indiscriminate open-
ing of mines for gold and other precious metals has de-
stroyed the environment and shocked Tibetans with the dis-
figurement of their sacred mountains.Ha ndl ing  of  t he  cri s is
Thus the crisis erupted in the context of a political harden-
ing that had come about over many years and with the ex-
ceptional background of the run-up to the Beijing Olympics,
which the CCP wanted to turn into a triumphal show of
strength as much at home as abroad. In this context it is all
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7. Zhongguo Zangxue yanjiu zhongxin (China Tibetology Research Centre), “From ‘Two
Approvals’ to ‘Three Adherings’: Central Government Policy towards the 14th Dalai
Lama,” Qiushi, n° 479, 16 May 2008. The “Two Approvals,” set out by Mao, require the
Dalai Lama to approve Beijing’s hold over Tibet and the necessity for democratic and
socialist reform there; the “Three Adherings,” coined by Hu Jintao, are to the leadership
of the CCP, to the socialist system, and to the autonomy of ethnic regions.
8. Pascale Nivelle, “La jeune garde tibétaine sourde à la modération du dalaï-lama”
(Tibetan youth deaf to Dalai Lama’s moderation), Libération, 20 March 2008.
9. See among others, Willy Lam, “Hope for a Better Tibet Policy,” Far Eastern Economic
Review, April 2008.
10. Geoffrey York, “Why Tibet Is Boiling Over,” Globe and Mail, 21 March 2008.











the more amazing that the authorities’ handling of the crisis
smacked of improvisation and inattention. Much remains un-
clear to this day. In light of the high-profile Olympics round
the corner, the authorities should have been prepared for
more serious events on 10 March, the anniversary of the
Dalai Lama’s flight into exile in 1959. And if the region’s
two top officials were obliged to attend the NPC session in
Beijing, they ought to have left behind detailed instructions.
In fact, the police handling of protests between 10 and 14
March was out of all proportion. There was a certain re-
straint to begin with, but arrests took place nevertheless, and
it was inevitable that there would be demands for the release
of those arrested. A stepping up of protests could therefore
have been foreseen. In any event, throughout the day on 14
March, the police let the rioters be, filming their actions all
the while. This amazing passivity could raise suspicions of a
Machiavellian trap, but might well have resulted from dys-
function in the police chain of command. Li Datong, a Chi-
nese journalist out of favour with the authorities, observes:
“A country ruled by law should guarantee its citizens’ right
to protest. In those circumstances, if citizens break the law,
they should be stopped without hesitation. But China has
things the wrong way around. The lawful right to protest of
a number of monks was crudely taken away, and then when
trouble started there was no timely intervention due to fears
over international opinion. This allowed the riots to get out
of control and resulted in loss of life and damage to prop-
erty.” (12)
After the inexplicable restraint of that day, the authorities
came down with ruthless force. In many ways, the vigorous
counter-attack by the military, police, and media resembled
the crushing of the 1989 Tiananmen movement. Entire
trainloads of military reinforcements arrived, mainly from
Sichuan, and in the days following 14 March Chinese police
arrested 953 suspects, indicting more than 400 of them. (13)
As after Tiananmen, a massive publicity effort was mounted.
An atmosphere of terror appears to have been created in all
regions with Tibetan populations, with arrests and frequent
police raids, and armoured carriers patrolling the streets of
many cities. Tibetans accused the armed police of routinely
beating people in the streets or in police stations.
That demonstrations continued even under these conditions
indicates the Tibetans’ determination. Chinese police admit-
ted firing warning shots during some demonstrations in
March, and the death of one Tibetan as a result, but Ti-
betan organisations in exile claim that more than 200 were
killed. It is difficult to endorse either figure, but the informa-
tion black-out imposed by the Chinese authorities, who also
expelled all foreigners, suggested they had something to
hide. There is a Chinese saying: “Close the door before
beating your dog.” The fact that travel to Tibet (and Tibetan
populated areas in other regions) remains difficult for for-
eigners, especially journalists, indicates that the situation is
far from resolved more than a year after the events.
The news blackout was not limited to foreign media. Most
Chinese media other than those under the most direct con-
trol were unable to report on the events in Tibet. Some Chi-
nese journalists complained, and a few discordant voices suc-
ceeded in being raised, such as in the Guangdong-based
Nanfang group of publications, the China Youth Daily, and
the economic magazine Caijing. But Nanfang’s Zhang Ping
was sacked as deputy chief editor of Southern Metropolis
Weekly because of an article entitled “How to find the truth
about Lhasa?” (14)
Keeping Tibet off-limits to the media went against China’s
public assurances over the Olympic Games. It showed that
in a crisis, the Chinese leadership fell back on its “funda-
mentals”: repression and news blackout. Everything was
banned as “sensitive,” despite prior international commit-
ments. Thus a world congress of anthropologists and ethnol-
ogists scheduled for July 2008 in Kunming was scrapped, al-
though 6,000 scholars from around the globe had regis-
tered. (15) Given the mood then, ethnology had become a
dangerous science.
In a major crisis, the regime’s veneer of legality vanishes.
Thus Chinese lawyers who had openly offered to defend
jailed Tibetans and demanded that they be entitled to due
process were immediately threatened with non-renewal of
their licences, and the threat was carried out in some cases.
69N o  2 0 0 9 / 3
12. Li Datong, “China’s soft power failure,” Open Democracy, 19 May 2008, accessible at
http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/china_inside/chinas-soft-power-failure.
13. Le Monde, 9 April 2008.
14. “Chinese editor fired over Tibet commentaries,” Reuters, 6 May 2008.












Tibetan activists chant anti-Chinese slogans during a
demonstration in front of the consular section of the
Chinese Embassy in Kathmandu on 31 August 2008. 
© AFP
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The measure affected everyone sharing the offices of the tar-
geted lawyers so as to exert greater pressure through the use
of an archaic but frequently used method in China: collec-
tive punishment. The Tibetans who were tried were not al-
lowed to choose their lawyers. (16) Extra-legal methods were
used to block information. Thus the blog of Woeser (Weise
in Chinese), a Beijing-based Tibetan writer who put out
news using an Internet address hosted abroad, was hacked
into and disfigured by a nationalist group calling itself “The
Red Hackers Alliance,” and her list of Skype contacts was
stolen in an apparent bid to trick them into revealing sensi-
tive information. (17)
The regime’s basic traits include a penchant for aggressive
propaganda: denouncing ill-intentioned enemies everywhere
through the use of Mao-era hate words. Thus the
“Dalai  clique” alludes to various “anti-Party  cliques” that
were periodically denounced under Mao. The use of
“Dalai” (without the “Lama”) recalls all the insults used
against those who had the misfortune of being categorised
as political enemies. The greatest propaganda “success” con-
sisted of keeping a firm lid on the news of some 150 demon-
strations that took place, while giving prominence in the of-
ficial media to the 14 March riots in Lhasa. (18)
From the point of view of usage, the term dazaqiangshao
(beating-smashing-looting-burning) used to describe the action
of Tibetan rioters harks back to the Mao era, more specifically
the Cultural Revolution. After having eliminated most of the
leaders he deemed enemies, when Mao decided it was time
to restore some order, a notice went out on 6 June 1967 to
correct the “deviationist wind” consisting of “beating, smash-
ing, looting, confiscating, and kidnapping” (daza-
qiangchaozhua). The Red Guards who had gone too far with
such actions had thus become “beating-smashing-looting ele-
ments” (dazaqiang fenzi). After Mao’s death and the arrest of
the Gang of Four, these elements came to be considered one
of “three categories of people” (sanzhong ren (19)) to be denied
promotions and important posts. That term was specific to the
period, and today’s protesters who use violent means or react
against police violence are more typically depicted as “rioters”
(baotu), “trouble makers” (saoluan fenzi), or “outlaws” (bu fa
fenzi). Needless to say, troublemakers are invariably “a hand-
ful” (yi xiao cuo), while the overwhelming majority (jue da
duoshu) supports the government. The incidents themselves
are often depicted as daza shijian (“beating-smashing inci-
dents”), but on occasion other actions are specifically labelled
“looting” or “burning.” Whenever the authorities wish to dis-
credit a challenge to public order from an otherwise non-vio-
lent demonstration, they use the term naoshi (troubles). As
demonstrations of discontent have proliferated in China in re-
cent years, a new term has been coined: qunzhong shijian
(“mass incidents”). But needless to say, this neutral term has
never been used to refer to the Tibet events of 2008, although
for the most part they were not violent. 
Furthermore, official propaganda was especially virulent
against foreign media, accused of deliberately distorting the
reality on the ground in Tibet. Although the Chinese press
was able to point out some stupid errors in the foreign
media, it is highly ironic that a country such as China could
go about criticising the press abroad, while its own remains
under watertight control and is manipulated by the Commu-
nist leadership, letting no one criticise any possible errors or
factual distortions. 
With its incomparable monopoly over images, official prop-
aganda was relatively effective. By constantly repeating a few
chosen bits of footage from the 14 March riots and nothing
at all from other demonstrations by Tibetans, and by high-
lighting the suffering of the riot victims, Chinese television
was able to project a highly negative image of Tibetans in
China and abroad, and above all to whip up a nationalistic
reflex, which on the one hand rallied the population around
the government and on the other sought to justify the brutal
repression. Such exposure of ethnic conflicts goes against
the CCP’s habitual response of denying or downplaying any
inter-communal tension, but the Tibet situation seemed to
warrant such a response in view of Western criticism. The
strategy also included claiming with no shred of convincing
proof that the “Dalai clique” was preparing suicide attacks
and that police had seized from monasteries 176 firearms,
13,000 bullets, 3,284 kilos of explosives, 19,000 sticks of dy-
namite and 350 knives. (20)
Despite their rigidity and resistance with regard to pressure
from abroad, the authorities agreed to resume negotiations
with the Dalai Lama’s representatives. (21) But it transpired
that this was merely a formal gesture, and the Chinese au-
thorities did not use it to effect a gradual change in attitude.
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16. “Public proposal to act for those accused in Lhasa riots draws flak,” South China
Morning Post, 10 May 2008. The lawyers’ open letter of 2 April 2008 was widely circu-
lated via the Internet.
17. See statement by Woeser, dated 27 April 2008, which was circulated widely on the
Internet. See also Jill Drew, “A lone Tibetan voice, intent on speaking out,” The
Washington Post, 6 May 2008.
18. See Robert Barnett’s article in this issue.
19. The other two categories were identified as those who made a career by following Lin
Biao and Jiang Qing and people who had taken the “Gang spirit“ too much to heart.
20. Chinese authorities have come up with various figures. See for example, “China lays out
conspiracy claims against Dalai Lama,” Reuters, 1 April 2008.











W hat  doe s  the  futur e hol d?
Since Hu Yaobang’s ouster and especially over the last sev-
eral years, the CCP strategy has been marked by intransi-
gence. The Chinese leadership is still deeply mired in the
Maoist conception of “contradictions,” and it is clear that
any Tibetan demand for genuine autonomy and greater reli-
gious or cultural freedom is viewed not as a “contradiction
among the people” but as an “antagonistic  contradiction”
(between the people and the enemies), the latter precluding
any compromise. This also leads the CCP to distort the po-
sition of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan protesters and
present it as a simple confrontation between devilish sepa-
ratists and valiant defenders of the motherland. 
While helping to rally the greater part of the Chinese popula-
tion behind the regime, this cynical policy courts disaster. By
categorically rejecting the Dalai Lama’s proposal for a middle
way and rejecting his role of interlocutor by insulting him and
forcing Tibetans to denounce him in public, the Chinese au-
thorities are digging themselves into a hole where only force
and violence work, and with no outcome possible apart from
a forced assimilation with a few sops thrown to an obedient
elite. There is growing suspicion, especially since the afore-
mentioned order regarding “Living Buddhas,” that the Chi-
nese leadership is simply waiting for the Dalai Lama’s death
so as to replace him with someone less charismatic and more
docile. The regime no doubt hopes that without the revered
spiritual leader around, Tibetans would lose much of their ca-
pacity to unite and resist, and that with the Nobel Peace Lau-
reate gone, the West would be less fascinated by the Tibetan
cause. This might well be so, but as Wang Lixiong, the Chi-
nese writer and husband of Woeser has said, should the Dalai
Lama die in exile it could lead to a feeling of despair in Tibet,
giving rise to more serious conflict than that of 2008. There
are two examples in the PRC itself of unrest caused by the
death of a leader: the April 5 movement after Zhou Enlai’s
death in 1976, and the Tiananmen movement after Hu
Yaobang’s demise in 1989. Of course, the balance of forces
is such that the Chinese authorities can rest assured of easy
victory — but at what cost on the ground and with how much
damage to China’s image abroad?
That is why it is necessary to conceive of a change in strategy
leading to an acceptance of real autonomy for the Tibetan
people. In theory, it is possible to envisage the CCP opting to
create for Tibet a status similar to that of Hong Kong and
Macao based on provisions in Article 31 of the Constitu-
tion. (22) That would only be proper, given that the 17-point
agreement of 1951 on the future of Tibet served as the model
for Hong Kong’s Basic Law. Many scholars have already dis-
cussed this idea. (23) But the balance of forces at play is differ-
ent, as the orderly return of Hong Kong to Chinese sover-
eignty could not have been taken for granted, whereas Tibet
is already under Chinese control. Tibetan representatives in
exile have often demanded that “greater Tibet” be accorded
the same status as Hong Kong, but have been regularly re-
buffed. There would have to be a change of heart within the
Chinese leadership for things to move forward. Limited steps
such as development of education for Tibetans in their own
language, or making it compulsory for officials posted in Tibet
to acquire  a smattering of Tibetan, could level the ground just
a little in the competition with Han immigrants and thus ease
tensions. Chinese leaders aren’t taken in by their own propa-
ganda and are well aware of Tibet’s real problems. (24)
In the near term, however, a change of orientation is well
neigh improbable, as the deeper the regime digs in with its
strategy of intransigence, the more difficult it will be to pull
back, on the one hand because much hatred has been spilled
on both sides, and on the other because it would be difficult
for the leadership to admit to having lied to the people for 20
years regarding the Dalai Lama, his personality, and his ac-
tions. China’s top leader, Hu Jintao, has been personally im-
plicated in this policy for many years, and the careers of most
cadres in charge of religion and minorities are based on it.
Another fear is that such demands could spread to other mi-
norities. More fundamentally, even if Tibet is an extreme
case, the current policy towards Tibetans is symptomatic of
the Chinese authorities’ overall relations with society. I am
persuaded by the words of a noted Beijing dissident, who told
me after the 2008  events in Tibet, “The Tibetans should
never forget that they’ll never have human rights so long as
the Chinese don’t have it.” I believe he was thinking not only
of the Tibetans but also of their Western friends, who mo-
bilise more readily over problems on the Roof of the World
than over general questions of human rights in China.
Thus it seems to me that a significant policy change in Bei-
jing is required before a new Tibet policy can emerge. I
think such a change need not be ruled out in the medium
term. Barring dramatic developments, possibly as a result of
some crisis, the earliest date to watch out for is 2012, when
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22. The article says: “The state may establish special administrative regions when neces-
sary. The systems to be instituted in special administrative regions shall be prescribed
by law enacted by the National People’s Congress in the light of the specific conditions.”
23. See, for example, Michael C. Davis, “Establishing a Workable Autonomy in Tibet,” Human
Rights Quarterly, n° 30, 2008, pp. 227-258.
24. See, for example, the report of a visit to Beijing at the time by Australian diplomats and
academics in John Garnaut, “Rivers of money not flowing to Tibetans,” Sydney Morning











Far from Harmonious: The Chinese Authorities’ Handling of the 2008 Tibet Crisis
a new generation of leaders will take office in Beijing. Mem-
bers of the generation of Red Guards and of youth sent
down to the countryside such as Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang, and
Wang Qishan mouth Maoist slogans with less conviction
than Hu Jintao, and could feel obliged to usher in an aggior-
namento of Chinese socialism. Even the seemingly more
conservative Xi Jinping is, after all, the son of the pro-reform
Xi Zhongxun, who was close to Hu Yaobang. 
But such change towards a less tense attitude towards the mi-
norities and towards Chinese society as a whole is certainly
not guaranteed. Current tendencies towards politico-ideologi-
cal hardening and exaltation of nationalism reveal fascist lean-
ings. But China is experiencing contradictory tendencies, and
it cannot be ruled out that the population, as well as the po-
litical elite, have wearied of a conception of social and polit-
ical stability based on absolute monopoly leadership, strict so-
cial control, and repression. Another conception of stability
based on dialogue and tolerance could help realise the stated
aims of the Chinese leadership: social harmony at home and
a peaceful rise to the status of a great power globally. Among
Chinese leaders, Tibet is evidently a tough nut to crack for
those favouring harmony, but its careful handling would be
rightly regarded as a major achievement and mark a high
point in the career of a political leader. •
• Translated by N. Jayaram
The term “April youth” (1) (siyue qingnian) refers to a community of “enthusiastic young patriots” (fuyou jiqing de aiguo qingn-
ian), as they call themselves, or “neo-conservative nationalists,” as labelled by foreign observers. They make up a section of a
much larger and more diverse world of “angry youth” (fenqing), a movement with many more or less radical national and inter-
national ramifications.
The Tibet uprising of March 2008 and its coverage in the Western media were the impetus for the website www.anti-CNN.com.
Launched on 18 March 2008 and registered at Tsinghua University in Beijing, it was the brainchild of Rao Jin, a 23-year-old
engineer from the Tujia ethnic group, and Qi Hanting, a 19-year-old journalism student, both Tsinghua students. At first the ini-
tiators sought to maintain the website as an open discussion forum, but they soon began reflecting the views of official media
reports. Indeed, the site received an official endorsement from China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman on 27 March. (2)
In fact, the “April youth” community seems to be propelled less by students in China than by their compatriots studying in the
United States. As early as 22 March 2008, overseas students addressed an open letter to the Western media and launched peti-
tions objecting to reports they deemed hostile to China. A demonstration was held on 26 April at the CNN headquarters in
Atlanta. Chinese youth abroad were the first to make use of cyberspace in responding to the issue, especially through the Anti-
CNN site.
Their anger is directed at the West — the United States in particular, but also France and Germany — with accusations of con-
spiring against China, of seeking to block its economic resurgence, and of manipulating the Tibetan unrest as a means of ruining
China. The “April youth” activists have a keen sense of language and knowledge of the world that brings a more moderate and
less vulgar tone to the fenqing movement. They care about their own image and don’t lose sight of their career prospects in the
midst of their preoccupations. They invoke “reason,” “truth,” “love,” and “peace.” A “poem” attributed to an expatriate physics
professor in the United States is typical of their sentiments:
…When we were silent, you said you wanted us to have free speech. When we are silent no more, you say we are brain-
washed-xenophobes... Enough is Enough, Enough Hypocrisy for This One World. We want One World, One Dream,
and Peace on Earth. This Big Blue Earth is Big Enough for all of Us.” (3) •
• Translated by N. Jayaram
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China’s “April Youth” Lara Maconi
Glossary
baotu 暴徒 bu fa fenzi 不法分子 daza shijian 打砸事件
dazaqiang fenzi 打砸搶分子 dazaqiangchaozhua 打砸搶抄抓
dazaqiangshao 打砸搶燒 jue da duoshu 絕大多數 naoshi 鬧事
qunzhong shijian 群眾事件 sanzhong ren 三種人 
saoluan fenzi 騷亂分子 Tuanpai 團派 yi xiao cuo 一小撮
